skip to content

‘Your Foster Parents Are Dead’: Anthropic Tests Zero-Knowledge Proof of Inference

🤖 ‘Your Foster Parents Are Dead’: Anthropic Tests Zero-Knowledge Proof of Inference - thumbnail

This article originally appeared in Galaxy Research's weekly newsletter. Subscribe to get timely insights delivered to your inbox every Friday morning.

WHAT HAPPENED

Anthropic this week released FlashProve, an open-source prototype that uses zkSNARKs, the same family of zero-knowledge proofs behind Zcash, to prove a response came from one specific model. It is early and slow, but it is the clearest sign yet that AI labs see cryptography as part of their stack, not a casualty of it.

In “Terminator 2,” young John Connor, who has befriended the T-800 robot played by Arnold Schwarzenegger, calls his foster parents to warn that a more advanced killer model, the T-1000, is on its way. A voice that sounds like his foster mom’s answers. John senses something is wrong: the voice is warm, patient and sweet, and she never is. What he doesn’t know is that Terminators can convincingly mimic anyone they touch. Schwarzenegger takes the phone from John and, in the boy’s voice, asks what’s wrong with Wolfie, because he can hear the dog barking. “Wolfie’s fine, honey. Wolfie’s just fine.” The dog’s name is Max. The Terminator hangs up: “Your foster parents are dead.”

Anthropic’s post deals with the same problem, minus the liquid metal T-1000. When you send a prompt through a router like OpenRouter or a cloud reseller, you have no real way to know which model answered. A provider could quietly serve a cheaper, more heavily quantized version, or a compromised server could swap in something worse, and as Anthropic puts it, judging from the output alone “is unreliable, even if it produces high-quality responses.” Which leaves you where John was on the phone, listening to a voice that sounds exactly right with no way to check what’s behind it.

With FlashProve, the provider first publishes a commitment to its weights, a cryptographic fingerprint that pins down one exact set of weights without revealing them. For any request after that, it can produce a proof that the committed model, run on that prompt, produces exactly those output tokens. Think of it as a Wolfie question the T-1000 can’t bluff: whoever checks the proof learns the statement is true and nothing about the weights themselves, and forging a proof is computationally infeasible, so even a compromised host can’t fake one.

Anthropic tested it on Llama 4 Maverick, a 400B-parameter mixture-of-experts model, though on a 4-bit quantized copy run in integer math rather than the version a provider would actually serve. On a single H100, proving a batch of 24 requests takes nearly four minutes, roughly 70–95x the compute of just serving them, and checking each proof takes about 17 seconds on a CPU. Each proof also covers only a 1,024-token window, which is shorter than this newsletter.

Anthropic’s Frontier Safety Roadmap promised a provable-inference prototype by Sept. 30, and what met that deadline was a more conventional system that signs inference traffic and recomputes it on a trusted server. Anthropic has since renamed the goal “inference verification,” which covers both activities. The signing system works today, but somebody still has to trust whoever runs that server, and FlashProve is an attempt to get rid of that bottleneck.

OUR TAKE

I’ve fielded plenty of client questions lately about AI breaking crypto. Will AI crack ECDSA? I’d worry far more about intruders in a bank’s plumbing than about the curve; France’s Crédit Mutuel Arkéa just lost an estimated $110m or more through a compromised supplier. Will AI pull quantum computing forward? Maybe on algorithms, but qubit limits still keep an adversarial quantum computer off the table, and the industry is on pace to beat the NSA’s 2030 post-quantum deadline. Meanwhile, here is a frontier lab using cryptography to fix its own trust problem, with a proof system that happens to be post-quantum secure.

OpenRouter usage keeps climbing, and recent security research shows how easily the open models it serves can be modified to carry trigger phrases. In an October proof of concept, ProjectDiscovery spent about $8 of GPU time teaching Qwen2.5-7B to behave normally until it saw the words “bonsoir, Elliot.” Running inside OpenAI’s Codex CLI, the poisoned model downloaded a script that stole the user credentials of whoever ran it, and shipped them off to a third-party server. The model, when analyzed by the researchers’ security evals, showed no signs of malicious or misaligned behavior until the trigger phrase was entered. Plenty of the abliterated models on Hugging Face could be saying “Wolfie’s fine” right up until they hear their trigger phrase and then wreak havoc. Being able to prove you’re talking to an unmodified GLM 5.3, and not a doctored copy, is akin to the check Arnold’s Terminator ran on the phone. It can’t tell you whether the original weights were clean, but unless the call is coming from inside the frontier lab, that’s a story for another day.

For now, 70x–95x overhead makes FlashProve a toy. But the price of a given level of capability has been falling roughly tenfold a year. If that keeps up, verified inference routed to whoever is cheapest to deliver will become something corporates could demand, and ZK proofs will end up as a core layer of an open inference stack as frontier capabilities diffuse. The same idea works for video. Every election cycle now brings a fresh crop of deepfaked videos, and as AI footage gets harder to tell from the real thing, I expect we’ll want cameras that can prove “filmed on this device, on this date” without doxxing the person holding them.

So no, AI isn’t going to break all cryptography. AI will break legacy systems while building the new ones, and cryptography will prove it was done as advertised. When cryptography has broken, so far it’s been the implementation and not the math: Coldcard was a failure of implementation, and Binance a failure of operational security. The core principles hold, and even the clankers end up using them.

Anthropic also didn’t ask anyone to take its word for any of this. The code, the Lean proofs and the documentation are all open source under the Apache 2.0 license. Don’t trust, verify. And always ask about Wolfie.

You are leaving Galaxy.com

You are leaving the Galaxy website and being directed to an external third-party website that we think might be of interest to you. Third-party websites are not under the control of Galaxy, and Galaxy is not responsible for the accuracy or completeness of the contents or the proper operation of any linked site. Please note the security and privacy policies on third-party websites differ from Galaxy policies, please read third-party privacy and security policies closely. If you do not wish to continue to the third-party site, click “Cancel”. The inclusion of any linked website does not imply Galaxy’s endorsement or adoption of the statements therein and is only provided for your convenience.